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An Exploration of Compulsory 
Licensing as an Effective Policy Tool 
for Antiretroviral Drugs in India* 
Dipika Jain† & Jonathan J. Darrow†† 
Abstract 
Access to affordable drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases is increasingly challenging in many developing countries such as 
Brazil, South Africa, and India. These challenges are in part the result of 
strengthened patent laws mandated by the 1994 Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty. However, there are 
underutilized instruments within TRIPS that governments can use to 
limit the adverse effects of patent protection and thereby ensure a 
supply of affordable generic drugs to their people. One such instrument 
is compulsory licensing, which allows generic manufacturers to produce 
pharmaceutical products that are currently subject to patent protection. 
Compulsory licensing has been used by a number of countries in the last 
few years, including the United States, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Brazil, and Thailand, and is particularly significant for countries such as 
India, where large numbers of people are infected with HIV. This Article 
explores the feasibility of compulsory licensing as a tool to facilitate 
access to essential medicines within the current patent regime in India, 
drawing on the experiences of other countries.   
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Introduction 
Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment remains the only proven treatment 
to extend the lives of individuals living with HIV/AIDS.1 Nevertheless, 
access to affordable ARV drugs is increasingly challenging in many 
developing countries including Brazil, South Africa, and India. According 
to a 2007 joint report of the World Health Organization and the United 
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, 2.5 million people in India are infected 
with the disease.2 The infection is manageable in these developing 
countries only because of the emergence of ARV drug treatment, also 
known as antiretroviral therapy, highly active antiretroviral therapy, or 
potent combination antiretroviral therapy.3 
The US Food and Drug Administration approved the first antiretro-
viral HIV drug, zidovudine (AZT, sold under the brand names Retrovir 
and Retrovis) in 1986.4 The discovery that AZT, a drug originally 
intended to treat cancer, could effectively reduce HIV in the body, 
represented hope for a better life for the tens of thousands of HIV-
positive people around the world. As one of the most expensive drugs 
 
1. See generally Patent Situation of HIV/AIDS-Related Drugs in 80 
Countries, UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG. 13–15 (2000), 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip17e/whozip17e.pdf 
(providing a list of patents protecting HIV/AIDS-related drugs throughout 
the world). 
2. UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE: REGIONAL 
SUMMARY 5 (2008), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/ 
jc1527_epibriefs_asia_en.pdf. 
3. NAT’L CTR. HIV/AIDS, VIRAL HEPATITIS, STD, & TB PREVENTION, CDC, 
BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE PREVENTION BENEFITS OF HIV TREATMENT 1–2 
(2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/treatment/resources/ 
factsheets/pdf/Prevention_Benefits_of_HIV_Treatement.pdf. 
4. Michael Shernoff & Raymond A. Smith, HIV Treatments: A History of 
Scientific Advance, THE BODY (July 2001), http://www.thebody.com/ 
content/art30909.html. 
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ever to reach the market,5 AZT also represented the beginning of a 
struggle for affordable treatment that continues today. The drug was 
prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of HIV-infected persons in 
developing countries. 
The emergence of generic ARV drugs from India brought some relief 
beginning in 1991, selling for one-quarter of the price of the original 
AZT.6 India soon emerged as a world leader in the generic manufacture 
of AIDS drugs, bringing prices within reach of not only those in India, 
but also many more around the world. India remains the supplier of 
choice for medications in most developing countries, producing medicines 
of respected quality that meet international standards at the lowest 
cost.7 A study comparing the prices in India and other countries where 
patent protection exists found that drugs are up to forty-one times more 
expensive in countries with patent protection than in those countries 
without it.8 A 1990 study by an economist from the International 
Monetary Fund reported that drug prices in Malaysia, where drug 
product patent protection already existed, were from 20 to 760 percent 
higher than in India,9 which did not have drug product patent protection 
at the time. The Indian pharmaceutical industry has been an important 
supplier of generic ARVs both domestically and to the less-regulated 
markets of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Today, India continues to 
be a major supplier of finished products, including vaccines and ARVs, 
to buyers around the world.  
At the same time, certain international developments over the past 
two decades have threatened access to essential medications. In 1995, the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
5. Brian O’Reilly & Nora E. Field, The Inside Story of the AIDS Drug, 
FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at 113 (noting a year’s worth of AZT cost $10,000 
in 1990). 
6. Carin Håkansta, The Battle on Patents and AIDS Treatment, 34 BIOTECH. 
& DEV. MONITOR 16 (1998); see also Eloan Pinheiro et al., Examining the 
Production Costs of Antiretroviral Drugs, 20 AIDS 1745, 1746 (2006) 
(noting “a significant decrease” in the price of ARVs between 2001 and 
2006). 
7. Caroline Berman et al., India’s Pharmaceutical Industry: A Shift in 
Strategy, in WINNING STRATEGIES FOR THE INDIAN MARKET 176 (Anuradha 
Dayal-Gulati & Dipak Jain eds., 2010); Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to 
Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic Manufacturers in Supplying 
Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 
1, 2 (2010). 
8. K. Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguards 
under TRIPS, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 
ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 13 (Christophe Bellmannet et al. 
eds., 2003). 
9. Id. at 137. 
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(TRIPS)10 committed most nations to implementing or strengthening 
patent legislation that would require pharmaceutical products (in 
addition to processes) to be eligible for patent protection. A patent is a 
right granted by a government to an inventor that allows that inventor, 
for a limited period of time, to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
or importing an invention. This Article examines the exclusionary function 
of patents that allows brand-name drug companies to temporarily exclude 
generic drug manufacturers from producing life-sustaining medications.  
Patent protection is often cited as one of the primary reasons for the 
limited availability and affordability of medication for HIV/AIDS.11 
Although patents are generally available for inventions related to any 
type of drug, the effects on HIV/AIDS drugs is particularly pointed 
because HIV/AIDS emerged quite recently in medical history and so the 
drugs that treat it are relatively new. Although patent rights are 
temporary and will eventually expire, not enough time has yet elapsed 
for most HIV/AIDS drugs to come off patent. Thus, there are often few 
effective options for patients who cannot afford newer, patented  
medications.  
Historically, many developing countries lacked strong protection of 
intellectual property rights,12 and even many developed countries did not 
allow patents to issue on pharmaceutical products until recently. Italy, 
for example, extended patent protection to pharmaceutical products only 
in 1978 as the result of a decision of its supreme court.13 Similarly, 
France began to recognize pharmaceutical product patents only in 1960; 
Japan in 1976; Germany in 1968, Denmark in 1983; Norway in 1992; and 
Finland in 1995.14 The TRIPS Agreement thus reinforced an existing 
trend toward extending patent coverage to include pharmaceutical 
products. Although the processes used to make pharmaceutical products 
were already patentable in many countries, there are often many 
 
10. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
11. See Waning et al., supra note 7, at 2. 
12. See, e.g., JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (2001). 
13. See F.M. Scherer & Sandy Weisburst, Economic Effects of Strengthening 
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Italy, 26 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. 
& COPYRIGHT L. 1009, 1009 (1995). 
14. Daniel J. Gifford, Government Policy Towards Innovation in the United 
States, Canada, and the European Union as Manifested in Patent, 
Copyright, and Competition Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 1339, 1350 (2004); Alan 
S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 126 n.258 
(1993).  
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different ways to synthesize a particular drug.15 As a result, it can be 
relatively easy to “invent-around” a process patent, weakening the effect 
of the patent holder’s right. In contrast, it is often difficult or impossible 
to “invent around” a product patent. The extension of patent protection 
to drug products (as distinct from the processes used to make them) 
therefore greatly strengthened the ability of pharmaceutical companies 
to exclude others from making those products.  
Developing countries such as India, China, and Brazil were permitted 
to delay implementation of their obligations under the TRIPS  
Agreement until 2005.16 This negotiated delay allowed those countries 
time to readjust and plan for the eventual phase-in of stricter intellectual 
property laws. Eventually it was realized that even this ten-year phase-in 
period was insufficient for the least-developed countries, and in 2002, the 
TRIPS Council (the WTO body that oversees the TRIPS Agreement) 
issued a decision extending until January 1, 2016, the date by which least-
developed country members had to institute pharmaceutical patent 
protection.17 A list of least-developed countries is maintained by the 
United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed 
Countries.18 India is not a least-developed country (neither are China or 
Brazil) and so it does not benefit from the extended deadline.  
Consistent with its TRIPS obligation, the Indian government passed a 
new Indian Patents (Amendment) Act in 2005 (2005 IPA), extending 
patent protection to cover pharmaceutical products for the first time since 
the elimination of colonial-era drug patents in 1970.19 The 2005 IPA 
protected generic drugs already on the market as of January 1, 2005, from 
the institution of infringement proceedings, allowing companies to  
continue to sell these inexpensive generic products upon the payment of a 
 
15. See Linfong Tzeng, Follow-On Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 154–55 (2010). 
16. See TRIPS art. 66; see also Laura Chung, Use of Paragraph 6 System for 
Access to Medicine, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 137, 174 (2010). 
17. The Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period Under 
Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country 
Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 1, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm. 
18. About LDCs, UN-OHRLLS, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ (last 
visited May 25, 2013). 
19. Philippe Cullet, The Patents Amendment Act and Access to Medicine, 
INT’L ENVT’L L. RESEARCH CTR. (May 27, 2002), http://www.ielrc.org/ 
content/n0204.htm. The United Kingdom had extended patent protection 
to drug products in 1949. Gutterman, supra note 14, at 126 n.258. India, as 
a British colony, had similar protection. Linda L. Lee, Trials and  
TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 290–91 (2008). 
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reasonable royalty.20 However, many new AIDS therapies continued to be 
developed.21 Significantly, some of these new therapies help to combat the 
virus once it develops resistance to existing combinations of antiretroviral 
drugs.22 These newer drugs are therefore known as “second-line” ARV 
therapies,23 and contingency “third-line” ARV treatments also exist.24  
While many first-line ARVs were produced and marketed in India 
prior to 1995 and therefore escape the 2005 legislation, the availability 
and affordability of any drugs introduced in India after that date remain 
in question. Branded products may be priced out of reach, while generic 
versions introduced to the Indian market on or after January 1, 2005, 
are generally illegal and therefore not allowed in the Indian market 
unless authorized by the patent holder.25 As a result, the 2005 IPA 
precludes the generic production of newer, more expensive second-line 
treatments that are needed for people living with resistant strains of 
HIV/AIDS until the patents on those newer drugs expire. Though 
patent-protected ARV drugs are relatively few in number, their high 
cost means that they nevertheless represent a very large percentage of 
health and treatment budgets. For example, of fourteen ARV drugs in 
the Brazilian National AIDS Program, three accounted for 63 percent of 
total program costs.26 With new waves of ARV drugs being produced to 
combat resistance, access to the newest treatments will only worsen 
 
20. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005,  
§ 10(c) (amending section 11A of the 1970 Indian Patent Act) [hereinafter 
Indian Patent Act (2005)]. 
21. Antiretroviral Drugs Used in the Treatment of HIV Infection, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/byAudience/ForPatient 
Advocates/HIVandAIDSActivities/ucm118915.htm (last visited June 3, 
2013) (listing a number of HIV drugs approved after January 1, 2005, 
including Edurant, extended-release Viramune XR, and combination drug 
Stribild. 
22. See Maxwell R. Morgan, Medicines for the Developing World: Promoting 
Access and Innovation in the Post-TRIPS Environment, 64 U. TORONTO 
FAC. L. REV. 45, 72 n.139 (2006). 
23. Id. 
24. UNAIDS, FAST FACTS ABOUT HIV TREATMENT 3 (2009), 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/ 
factsheet/2009/20090903_fastfacts_treatment_en.pdf. 
25. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous 
Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 575–76 (2007) (noting 
that the 2005 Indian Patent Act makes an exception for products already 
being sold prior to January 1, 2005, which may continue to be lawfully sold 
after that date, although the patent holder will be entitled to receive a 
reasonable royalty following the issuance of the patent in India).  
26. Eric Goemaere et al., Letter to the Editor, Patent Status Matters, 23 
HEALTH AFF. 279, 279 (2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
cgi/content/full/23/5/279-a. 
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because these new drugs will generally be subject to patent protection 
and priced accordingly.  
Because membership in the WTO meant conforming to its patent  
policies, country representatives repeatedly voiced concerns regarding 
access to medicines.27 In 2001, these concerns culminated in the issuance of 
the Doha Declaration, a statement by the WTO Ministerial Conference 
recognizing both the importance of intellectual property to the develop-
ment of new medicines, as well as “the gravity of the public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.”28 As a result of the Doha Declaration and its related delibera-
tions, the developing country members, led by Brazil and India, effectively 
negotiated for flexibilities within the TRIPS regime beyond those that it 
already contained.29 For example, there were already instruments within 
TRIPS that national governments could utilize to ensure a supply of 
affordable medication, including most notably the compulsory licensing 
provisions of TRIPS Article 31.30 The 2003 Doha Implementation Decision 
addressed the inability of compulsory licenses to serve the needs of 
developing countries that did not themselves have sufficient manufactur-
ing capacity by allowing third countries (such as India) to issue 
compulsory licenses to export to these countries.31 
The compulsory license is an important tool that can protect the  
public from patent holders who refuse to license or sell their products on 
reasonable terms.32 Under the terms of the TRIPS Agreement as modified 
by the 2003 Doha Implementation Decision, governments may issue 
compulsory licenses to permit government or third-party manufacture of a 
patented invention without the patent holder’s permission, so long as 
certain conditions are met.33 Governments may choose to issue them, for  
27. Jayashree Watal, Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries: 
Does the WTO TRIPS Agreement Hinder It? 2 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. for 
Int’l Dev., Discussion Paper No. 8, 2000), available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/biotech/papers/discussion8.pdf. 
28. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 Nov. 2001, 
WT/MN(01)/DEC/2 [hereinafter 2001 Doha Declaration]. 
29. See Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 
(Sept. 1, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Doha Implementation]; see also Watal, 
supra note 27, at 3. 
30. TRIPS art. 31 (“Other Use Without Authorization of Rights Holder”); see 
also TRIPS art. 30 (“Exceptions to Rights Conferred”). 
31. 2003 Doha Implementation. 
32. Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison 
of India and South Africa, 91 KY. L.J. 911, 922 (2003). 
33. TRIPS art. 31; see generally Roger Kampf & Hannu Wager, The Role of 
the TRIPS Agreement in Global Health Policy, STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 17, 
22 (2011). 
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example, if patent owners offer their inventions at a price too high for 
potential buyers to afford,34 so long as the proposed user has made efforts 
to obtain a voluntary license, the license is issued for public non-
commercial use, or there is a national emergency.35 Generic companies can 
then produce the patented product and offer it to the public at affordable 
cost.36  
Even under a compulsory license, however, the patent holder must 
be paid a reasonable royalty under the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.37 
In this sense, government-issued compulsory licenses are not altogether 
different from the government-imposed price controls on drugs that 
prevail in most of the world’s developed countries.38 Both serve to 
substantially limit the profit a patent holder can earn. Thus, attention-
grabbing references to compulsory licenses as the “nuclear option”39 are 
significantly overstated. 
Well-known commentators on access to essential medicines issues, 
such as Jamie Love and Carlos Correa, consider compulsory licenses to 
be effective tools that place reasonable limits on patent rights,40 and 
developing-country governments have demonstrated their potency in 
practice. For example, Brazil effectively and consistently manages to 
control the costs of ARV drugs by threatening to issue compulsory 
licenses under the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.41 As a result of such 
maneuvering, the average cost per individual per day of ARV treatment 
decreased by 65 percent for one drug and 59 percent for another—a 
 
34. Cf. Jessica J. Fayerman, The Spirit of TRIPS and the Importation of 
Medicines Made Under Compulsory License After the August 2003 TRIPS 
Council Agreement, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 260 (2005). 
35. TRIPS art. 31(b).  
36. See id.  
37. TRIPS art. 31(h).  
38. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: INT’L TRADE ADMIN., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE 
CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, 
PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND INNOVATION viii (2004), 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/drugpricingstudy.pdf (noting that all 
eleven OECD countries studied imposed some form of price control). 
39. See, e.g., Corrupted: Brazil’s Corruption Scandal May Deal a Blow to 
Intellectual-Property Rights, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2005, at 61. 
40. See generally Carlos Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of 
Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing Countries (South Centre, 
Working Paper No. 5, 1999), available at http://southcentre.org/ 
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=15; JAMES 
LOVE, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT 
ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 17-18 (2005), available at http://apps.who.int/ 
iris/bitstream/10665/69199/1/WHO_TCM_2005.1_eng.pdf. 
41. See Brent Savoie, Note, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era 
of Epidemiologic Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 237–38 (2007). 
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testament to the effectiveness of the mere availability of compulsory 
licensing, even if no compulsory license is actually issued.42  
The main objective of this Article is to critically explore the feasibility 
of compulsory licensing as a policy tool to facilitate access to essential 
medicines within the current Indian patent regime in the context of the 
global political climate. Part I is an examination of both the historical 
discourse regarding patent law and the implications of the TRIPS regime 
in India. Part II looks at flexibilities provided within the TRIPS regime 
vis-à-vis access to drugs. Part III examines the compulsory licensing 
provision within the 2005 IPA. It evaluates the political dimensions of 
the issue, discusses proposed amendments to Indian patent law, explores 
bilateral pressures exerted by developed countries on developing coun-
tries with respect to TRIPS flexibilities, and considers Thailand’s use of 
compulsory licensing in 2007. Part IV critically explores the compulsory 
licensing provision implemented in Canada and the benefit that accrued 
to that nation’s generic drug industry. Part V concludes by discussing 
the political environment in which the pharmaceutical industry operates.  
I. TRIPS and Its Implications for Indian Law 
To clearly understand the implications of the TRIPS regime on Indian 
patent law and thus on access to drugs, the nature and history of the 
Indian patent system must be explored. The Indian Patent Act of 1856, 
implemented while India was under British rule, remained in effect even 
after India achieved independence in 1947.43 The Act provided for 
patents lasting fourteen years for both processes and products, with 
extensions as permitted by the Governor General.44 Even after independ-
ence, foreign interests controlled eight of the ten pharmaceutical 
companies with the largest retail sales in India and possessed 80–90 
percent of the patents.45 To evaluate the impact of the Indian Patent 
Act of 1856 on the cost of medicines, the Indian government convened 
two committees in 1970.46 The committees’ recommendations led to a 
landmark new law—the Indian Patent Act of 1970 (the 1970 IPA).  
The 1970 IPA reduced patent rights in a number of ways. It short-
ened the duration of pharmaceutical process patents to seven years, 
 
42. Brazil Wins Fights Over Prices of Merck AIDs Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
29, 2001. 
43. Santanu Mukherjee, The New Indian Patent Law: A Challenge for India, 1 
INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGT. 131, 131 (2006). 
44. Id. 
45. PAUL WILSON & AARTHI RAO, INDIA’S ROLE IN GLOBAL HEALTH R&D 47 
(2012), available at http://healthresearchpolicy.org/sites/healthresearch 
policy.org/files/assessments/files/R4D%20-%20Indias%20Role%20in%20 
Global%20Health%20RD%20Final.pdf. 
46. N.R. AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW (1959). 
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eliminated pharmaceutical product patents, and established automatic 
compulsory licensing.47 The 1970 IPA also prohibited patent protection 
on food and agrochemical products.48 As a result of these changes, India 
became one of the most prolific countries in the world with respect to 
the production of low-cost drugs.49 The passage of the 1970 IPA made it 
clear that the Indian government was focused on public health and the 
expansion of the Indian generic manufacturing industry. By 2004, “India 
supplie[d] 22 percent of the world’s generic drugs and a significant 
proportion of the vaccines made for the developing world.”50 
In 1995, India joined the WTO and, as a condition of its membership, 
became a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement.51 As required by TRIPS, 
India amended its Patent Act on January 1, 2005.52 The amendments 
resulted in the extension of patents to microorganisms and pharmaceutical 
products, the lengthening of the term of patent protection for both 
products and processes to twenty years, and the introduction of TRIPS-
compliant compulsory license provisions that were less generous than the 
previous law had been.53  
The changes resulting from the implementation of TRIPS obligations 
have been criticized as exacerbating difficulties in supplying ARV drugs to 
people in poor countries54 and contributing to the prioritization of phar-
 
47. See Laura Chung, Use of Paragraph 6 System for Access to Medicine, 36 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 137, 144–45 (2010). 
48. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, 27 India A.I.R. Manual 450, § 5 
[hereinafter Indian Patent Act (1970)]. 
49. See Mueller, supra note 25, at 514. 
50. CHERI GRACE, A BRIEFING PAPER FOR DFID: UPDATE ON CHINA AND INDIA 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 8 (2005), available at http://www.heart-
resources.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Update-on-China-an-India-and-
Access-to-Medicines.pdf. 
51. See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited June 2, 2013) 
(noting India’s date of membership as “1 January 1995”); Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155, art. II(2) (“The agreements and associated legal 
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 . . . are integral parts of this 
Agreement, binding on all Members”). Annex 1C contains the TRIPS 
Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.  
52. Indian Patent Act (2005), § 1(2). 
53. Id. §§ 2(a), 38(a), 55. 
54. SORCHA O’CARROLL, IMPORTING INDIAN GENERIC DRUGS FOLLOWING 
TRIPS: CASE STUDIES FROM ZAMBIA AND KENYA 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/SOCarroll_ImportingIndianGenericDrugs. 
pdf. 
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maceutical company profits above the legitimate needs of public health.55 
Although not without merit, such criticism of the TRIPS Agreement is 
overstated. In fact, TRIPS provides significant flexibilities that allow 
countries to mitigate the potentially harsh effects of pharmaceutical 
patents. 
II. TRIPS Flexibilities 
A 2001 WTO Ministerial Declaration contemporaneous with the Do-
ha Declaration affirms that “under WTO rules [including TRIPS] no 
country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection of 
human . . . health” provided that those measures “are otherwise in 
accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements.”56 The Doha 
Declaration itself proclaims that each member has the right to grant 
compulsory licenses and may freely determine the grounds upon which a 
compulsory license might be granted.57 Similarly, each member may 
determine what constitutes national emergencies and other circumstanc-
es of extreme urgency.58  
The Doha Declaration also notes that, in applying TRIPS, each of its 
provisions must be read in light of the objectives and purposes of the 
TRIPS Agreement as reflected in Articles 7 and 8.59 Article 7 notes that 
intellectual property rights should be protected and enforced in a manner 
“conducive to social and economic welfare” and “to a balance of rights and 
obligations.”60 Article 8 states that, in formulating or amending national 
patent legislation, members “may . . . adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of 
vital importance . . . .”61 
The Doha Declaration therefore emphasizes the right—already  
contained within the TRIPS Agreement62—to issue a compulsory license 
on pharmaceutical products. Although often misunderstood, the issuance 
of compulsory licenses under the TRIPS Agreement is not limited to 
 
55. See, e.g., Cecilia Oh, TRIPS and Pharmaceuticals: A Case of Corporate 
Profits over Public Health, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnside. 
org.sg/title/twr120a.htm (last visited June 1, 2013). 
56. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]. 
57. 2001 Doha Declaration, ¶ 5(b); see also Alberto do Amaral Junior, 
Compulsory Licensing and Access to Medicine in Developing Countries, 
YALE L. SCH. 7 (2005), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ 
Compulsory_Licensing.pdf. 
58. 2001 Doha Declaration, ¶ 5(c). 
59. Ministerial Declaration, ¶ 19. 
60. TRIPS art. 7. 
61. Id. art. 8. 
62. Id. art. 31. 
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cases of national emergency, nor was it so limited prior to the Doha 
Declaration. Under the TRIPS Agreement, interested parties must 
normally first request a license from the patent holder.63 TRIPS merely 
provides that this obligation to first negotiate in good faith with the 
patent holder is inapplicable in the case of national emergency.64 Stated 
differently, members are free to issue compulsory licenses even if there is 
no national emergency, so long as they first make efforts to obtain a 
voluntary license from the patent holder. In addition, the TRIPS 
Agreement allows members to issue compulsory licenses for public non-
commercial use (e.g., government-funded health care programs) where 
there is no national emergency even if they have not previously negotiated 
with the patent holder.65 Despite the attention that has been cast upon 
it, the Doha Declaration merely adds that “[e]ach member has the right 
to determine what constitutes a national emergency.”66 This clarification 
is of modest importance, however, given that a national emergency is not 
a prerequisite to the grant of a compulsory license. In short, Article 31 of 
TRIPS details a number of grounds for the grant of compulsory licenses 
(not all mentioned here) but provides WTO members with substantial 
freedom to determine when and to whom compulsory licenses can be 
issued.67 
Interestingly, TRIPS does not use the term “compulsory licensing.” 
Instead, Article 31 refers broadly to “use without authorization of the 
right holder” and includes use both by third parties and by the govern-
ment.68 In specifying the conditions for the grant of compulsory licenses, 
Article 31 refers to five possible grounds for granting them: (1) cases of 
refusal to deal; (2) situations of national emergency and extreme urgency; 
(3) as a remedy for anti-competitive practices; (4) public non-commercial 
use; and (5) to facilitate use of dependent patents.69 In addition, Article 
5(2) of the Paris Convention, a separate treaty negotiated in 1883, 
provides that “[e]ach country of the Union shall have the right to take 
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to 
prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive 
 
63. Id. art. 31(b). 
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001). 
67. Id. 
68. Sumana Chatterjee, Flexibilities Under Trips [Compulsory Licensing]: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry in India and Canada 6 (June 14, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1025386. 
69. TRIPS art. 31. “Dependent” patents are those that build from, and 
potentially infringe on, an underlying patent; the underlying patent is 
known as a “blocking patent” because, absent a compulsory license, it may 
block use of the dependent patent. 
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rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”70 Much of 
the Paris Convention, including Article 5(2), is incorporated by reference 
into the TRIPS Agreement, making its provisions binding on WTO 
member countries.71 
Unfortunately, while provisions exist for national governments to use 
tools such as compulsory licensing, it may not be politically or economically 
feasible to exercise such options. The United Nations Development 
Program’s 2001 Human Development Report found that “pressure from 
Europe and the United States makes many developing countries fear that 
they will lose foreign direct investment if they legislate for or use compul-
sory licences.”72 Given the importance of bilateral and international trade 
relationships in today’s globalized world, countries like India are pressured 
politically and economically to limit the use of compulsory licensing 
outside of national emergencies. This helps to explain the emphasis placed 
on the Doha Declaration’s reference to national emergencies despite the 
literal meaning of the text.  
III. Compulsory Licensing under The Indian Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 2005 
Chapter XVI of the 2005 Indian Patents (Amendment) Act (2005 
IPA) discusses compulsory licenses.73 Section 84 of the 2005 IPA provides 
for compulsory licenses to make way for access to drugs.74 Under both the 
1970 and 2005 IPAs, any person can make an application for a grant of a 
compulsory license for a patent three years after grant of that patent.75 
Among the grounds on which an application for compulsory license may 
be made include: (a) if the public deems the patented invention to be 
unsatisfactory; (b) if the public cannot access patented inventions at a 
reasonable price; and (c) if the patented invention is being worked outside 
 
70. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5(A)(2), 
Mar. 20, 1883, last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
71. TRIPS art. 2(1). 
72. CHERI GRACE, THE EFFECT OF CHANGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROSPECTS IN INDIA AND CHINA: 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES 35 (2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/Grace2China.pdf (quoting SAKIKO FUKUDA-
PARR ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001: MAKING NEW TECHNOLOGIES WORK FOR 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 107 (Bruce Ross-Larson & Justin Leites eds., 
2001)). 
73. FEROZ ALI KHADER, THE LAW OF PATENTS WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON 
PHARMACEUTICALS IN INDIA 717 (2007). 
74. Id.  
75. Indian Patent Act (1970), § 84; see also Indian Patent Act (2005), § 52 
(retaining the three-year period).  
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the territory of India.76 Subsection 6 of Section 84 provides that the 
Controller, an official appointed by the Ministry of Commerce, shall 
consider a number of factors when evaluating an application under Section 
84.77 These include the nature of the invention, the ability of the applicant 
to work the invention to the public advantage, the capacity of the 
applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital and working the 
invention if the application were granted, and whether the applicant has 
made efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms and 
conditions.78 Notably, Section 90 of the 2005 IPA also empowers the 
Controller to set the terms and conditions for compulsory licenses.79 As is 
evident from these provisions, the grant of compulsory licenses is perforated 
with technical indulgences and is administratively cumbersome.  
Under Section 84 of the Patent Act, an individual may submit an ap-
plication for a compulsory license to the Controller of Patents only after 
the expiration of three years from the date the patent was granted.80 If the 
reasonable expectations of the public with respect to access to the 
patented medication remain unfulfilled or the medication is not fairly 
priced, anyone may apply to the Controller for a compulsory license 
following the three-year period.81  
Concerns regarding this three-year lock-in period were raised by a 
number of stakeholders during interviews conducted by one of this 
Article’s authors to assess different perspectives on the use of compulsory 
licensing. The semi-structured interviews were conducted between 2008 
and 2010 in New Delhi, India, with experts from three sections: academia, 
civil society groups, and government policy makers. Interviewees from 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia were especially 
concerned. For example, Mr. Gopakumar of the Center for Trade and 
Development, an Indian NGO working on the issue of access to essential 
medicines, argued that Indian patent law needs substantial amendments 
so that it is easier to administer.82 Another expert, Mr. P. Chan, in the 
Lawyers Collective, another Indian NGO concerned with human rights 
issues such as access to drugs, stated that although Indian patent law 
remains the best law among the developing countries, the three-year 
 
76. KHADER, supra note 73, at 717. 
77. Id. 
78. SHAIL JAIN & R.K. JAIN, PATENTS: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 96 (2011). 
79. KHADER, supra note 73, at 722. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Interview with K. M. Gopakumar, Research Officer, Ctr. for Trade & Dev., 
in New Delhi, India (July 2008). 
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lock-in period is a cause for concern, and there is an urgent need for 
legislative reforms.83  
People living with HIV/AIDS are increasingly developing resistance 
to first-generation ARV drugs. They will therefore need to start taking 
second- and third-generation drugs, most of which will still be patented. 
An exclusive right to these drugs for three years can result in a  
prolonged lack of access to proper medication.  
In addition to the automatic three-year delay, Section 84 also  
requires that the person applying for a compulsory license set out the 
nature of that person’s interest,84 and a separate provision provides an 
opportunity for the patent holder to oppose the application.85 Applications 
for compulsory licenses can be significantly delayed during these opposi-
tion proceedings, thereby limiting the effectiveness of this provision. In 
considering the merits of an application, the Controller takes into account 
factors such as the nature of invention, the time elapsed, the applicant’s 
efforts in obtaining a voluntary license, the rate of royalty, etc.86 These 
factors may further complicate and delay the process.87 When disputes 
occur, litigation during the compulsory licensing process may further 
delay the accessibility of drugs. For example, in the 1978 case of Imperial 
Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Controller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks,88 the delay was so extreme that the case was closed 
because the patent expired before the dispute could be resolved.89 Similar 
delays could occur under the current patent provisions.  
To ensure an effective, speedy solution to the problem of access to 
essential medicines, the Indian Government should consider amending 
the current compulsory licensing provisions. First, it should eliminate the 
three-year waiting period before an application can be made for any 
ARV drug. Under the current regime, patients with serious diseases may 
die before an application for a compulsory license is even filed. Second, 
with regard to essential medicines, a priority review process should be 
made available to speed along the processing of applications once they 
have been filed. Third, a specific protocol and time period should be 
established with respect to negotiations for voluntary licenses. The 
TRIPS Agreement requires that (except in certain cases such as “national 
emergency” or “public non-commercial use”) a compulsory license cannot 
 
83. Interview with Mr. P. Chan, Lawyers Collective, in New Delhi, India (July 
2008).  
84. Indian Patent Act (1970), § 84(3). 
85. Id. § 92(2). 
86. JAIN & JAIN, supra note 78, at 96. 
87. See Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS, 1 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 
15, 27 (2005). 
88. See generally A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 77 (India). 
89. Id. ¶ 14. 
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be issued until negotiations for voluntary licenses have proven unsuccessful 
for more than “a reasonable period of time.”90 The uncertainty created by 
this vague requirement was reduced by the 2005 IPA, which specifies 
that six months “shall be construed” as a reasonable period of time.91 A 
shorter provision, however, would be preferable, such as the thirty-day 
period provided in Canadian patent legislation.92  
Many proponents of patenting argue that patents represent one of 
the most important incentives for commercial enterprises to undertake 
research and development by allowing them to enjoy financial returns 
based on the patent’s teachings.93 Thus, the three-year period allows the 
inventor at least some minimal amount of time to commercialize the 
invention, recover the investment, and make a profit. Proponents may 
further point out that in some cases it can take three years or more 
following the grant of a patent to obtain regulatory approval in a 
country such as India. During that time, the patent holder would not be 
able to profit from its invention. The three-year waiting period would 
thus make no difference even if a compulsory license was issued because 
the drug could still not be sold until approved by the health authorities. 
However, in those cases where a drug is approved prior to end of the 
three-year waiting period, it may be inappropriate to make desperate 
patients wait.  
HIV/AIDS is somewhat unusual in that it remains one of the few 
diseases common to both the developed and the developing world. 
Therefore, it is not inconceivable that pharmaceutical companies that 
produce ARV drugs can recoup their investment via sales to the  
developed world and accept smaller profits from sales to the developing 
world, such as those generated by the remuneration required by TRIPS 
in the case of compulsory licenses. A compulsory license does not negate 
all profits for the patent holder. Although royalty rates may be set at 
low levels, these rates may apply to vast quantities purchased by 
governments as part of public health programs. This can result in 
sizeable profits for the patent holder, even if those profits would be less 
than the patent holder might obtain by charging a very high price but 
only serving the wealthiest fraction of the population. Without affordable 
prices, the vast majority of the population in India will be unable to buy 
these drugs, suggesting that profits in developing countries such as India 
will be relatively small whether or not patents are used to restrict 
output. According to Harvard University Professor F.M. Scherer, if 
developing countries do not offer patent protection and allow generic 
 
90. TRIPS art. 31(b). 
91. Indian Patent Act (2005), § 52(b). 
92. Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c) (Can.). 
93. See, e.g., Jorge A. Goldstein & Elina Golod, Human Gene Patents, 77 
ACAD. MED. 1315, 1323–24 (2002). 
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competition on pharmaceutical products, the aggregate gain to consumers 
living in the poor countries is likely to be much more than the loss to 
pharmaceutical companies.94  
The various conditions imposed for the issuance of a compulsory  
license by the Controller should also be simplified or clarified. For 
example, the term “reasonable royalty” should be defined and not 
merely left to the unfettered discretion of the Controller General. 
Negotiations that take place in the absence of a clear framework for 
determining a royalty rate can unnecessarily delay the grant of a 
compulsory license. To combat needless delay, the law should provide for 
a shorter time period for the Controller to make a decision, including 
resolution of matters such as the nature of the invention and efforts to 
obtain the license. A reasonable period might be borrowed from Canadian 
patent law, which requires issuance of a compulsory license if  
negotiations do not lead to a voluntary license within thirty days.95 
Furthermore, the royalty rate could be fixed at a reasonable percentage 
as was done in Canada during legislative reforms, where the royalty rate 
was fixed at 4 percent.96 
Due to the ambiguities and administrative irregularities just  
discussed, the compulsory licensing provisions of the Indian Patent Act 
lack efficacy. It is therefore no surprise that India did not issue its first 
compulsory license to a generic drug manufacturer until 2012,97 seven 
years after the 2005 IPA was enacted. The drug, Nexavar (sorafenib 
tosylate), is widely used to treat kidney and liver cancer.98 It was 
developed and patented by Bayer and received FDA approval in 200599 
with Bayer receiving rights to market the drug in India in 2007.100 
 
94. See F.M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 
27 WORLD ECON. 1127, 1141 (2004). 
95. See Ashley Weber & Lisa Mills, A One-Time Only Combination: 
Emergency Medicine Exports Under Canada’s Access to Medicines 
Regime, 12 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. IN PRAC. 109, 115 (2010). 
96. Paul K. Gorecki & Ida Henderson, Compulsory Patent Licensing of Drugs 
in Canada: A Comment on the Debate, 7 CAN. PUB. POL’Y—ANALYSE DE 
POLITIQUES 559, 560 (1981). 
97. Access to Medicines: India Offers First Compulsory License, MEDECINS 
SANS FRONTIERES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/ 
press/release.cfm?id=5816&cat=press-release. 
98. Maricel Estavillo, India Grants First Compulsory Licence, For Bayer 
Cancer Drug, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2012/03/12/india-grants-first-compulsory-licence-for-bayer-
cancer-drug/. 
99. Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/ 
obdetail.cfm?Appl_No=021923&TABLE1=OB_Rx (last visited May 25, 
2013). 
100. Estavillo, supra note 98. 
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However, despite obtaining exclusive rights over the Indian market, 
Bayer did not import the drug to India at all in 2008 and imported only 
very small quantities in the following two years.101 As a result, the Indian 
generic drug manufacturing corporation Natco Pharma Ltd. applied to 
the Controller for a compulsory license.102 The justification for application 
fell within Section 84(1) of the IPA—that the reasonable needs of the 
public with respect to the patented invention had not been met.  
In a March 2012 decision, the Controller for the first time granted a 
compulsory license to a third party (Natco) to manufacture and sell a 
patented drug (Nexavar) within the Indian market.103 As a result of this 
compulsory license, the same drug can now be sold at one-tenth of the 
original price in the Indian market.104  
Bayer appealed the decision of the Controller on grounds that the 
corporation should have been given more time to “work” the patent in 
India even though the three-year period during which a compulsory license 
cannot be issued had already passed.105 Bayer received rights to market 
the drug in India in 2007, and Natco did not apply for a compulsory 
license until July 2011.106 Bayer is now appealing the decision in the 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board in Chennai, India, and hearings 
began on January 23, 2013.107 In March 2013, the Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board allowed the generic version to be on the market.108 Bayer 
lost the appeal.109 
 
101. Bayer explained its inaction by pointing to the allegedly infringing 
activities of Cipla, another Indian generic, which Bayer accused of illegally 
marketing a similar drug in India without authorization. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See Client Briefing: Patent Law Series—Compulsory License—A Growing 
Threat to Patent Holders?, CLIFFORD CHANCE (May 2012), 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2012/05/ 
client_briefing_patentlawseriescompulsor.html. 
104. C.H. Unnikrishnan, Compulsory Licences May Spur More Voluntary 
Licensing Deals, LIVEMINT (Jan. 24, 2013, 11:01 PM), 
http://www.livemint.com/Home-Page/f0R9060osU7bENFNwlnx5O/ 
Compulsory-licences-may-spur-more-voluntary-licensing-deals.html. 
105. Ramesh Shankar, Final Hearings in Bayer’s Appeal Against India’s First-
Ever CL on Nexavar to Begin at IPAB Soon, PHARMABIZ.COM (Jan. 22, 




108. Selina McKee, Bayer Loses Appeal in Indian Compulsory Licence Case, 
PHARMATIMES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-
03-05/Bayer_loses_appeal_in_Indian_compulsory_licence_case.aspx. 
109. Id.  
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Perhaps emboldened by the Nexavar license, the government  
department in charge of intellectual property rights policy making, the 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, is reportedly considering 
the issuance of more compulsory licenses to enable local Indian manufac-
turers to produce generic varieties of three specific anti-cancer drugs:110 
Sprycel (dasatinib), Ixempra (ixabepilone), and Herceptin (trastuzumab), 
each of which is currently patented by large foreign pharmaceutical 
companies.111 Even though no compulsory licenses have been issued yet, 
the case of Nexavar may have opened the door to more compulsory 
licenses for lifesaving drugs in the near future. 
IV. Compulsory Licensing in Canada 
Although India’s recent experience with compulsory licensing has 
garnered substantial international attention, it is not the first country to 
implement a flexible pharmaceutical patent regime. Other countries have 
experimented with similar models, including Canada—which, like India, 
has a very strong generic drug industry.112 A compulsory licensing 
provision has existed in Canada since 1923.113 When the country was 
faced with high drug prices in the 1960s, it took subsequent legislative 
measures to moderate drug pricing. One of these measures was the 
modification of its compulsory licensing provisions.  
In 1969, changes were made to Section 41(4) of the Canadian Patent 
Act that permitted licenses to be granted for imported drugs that were 
under patent protection.114 The Commissioner of Patents set the royalty 
rate at 4 percent.115 As a result of this legislative change, 290 licenses were 
issued for sixty-two drugs between 1969 and 1982.116 It was during this 
period that the generic pharmaceutical industry in Canada developed and 
flourished.117 In 1983, the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate affairs 
 
110. Unnikrishnan, supra note 104. 
111. Id. 
112. Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The Chinese Experiment 
with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 623, 658–59 (2012); see also Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure Function 
Analysis of Global Pharmaceutical Linkage Regulations, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 391, 408–09 (2011) (noting arguments that Canada’s substantial 
generics industry has been adversely affected by “patent linkage” 
provisions).  
113. James J. McRae & Francis Tapon, Compulsory Licensing as a Policy 
Instrument, 10(1) CAN. PUB. POL’Y–ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 74, 76 (1984). 
114. Gorecki & Henderson, supra note 96, at 560. 
115. Id. 
116. Paul K. Gorecki, Changing Canada’s Drug Patent Law: The Minister’s 
Proposals, 10(1) CAN. PUB. POL’Y–ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 77, 78 (1984). 
117. Id. 
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released a report stating that the steady use of compulsory licensing for 
drugs in Canada had significantly reduced drug prices.118 It further 
contained statistics suggesting that the use of compulsory licensing had 
not adversely affected manufacturing or investment in research and 
development (R&D).119  
In response to this report, a number of briefs were submitted to the 
government. Among the briefs was that of the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association of Canada (PMAC), the trade association of the 
Canadian research-based pharmaceutical industry.120 Predictably, PMAC 
argued that compulsory licensing had adversely affected the level of 
R&D121 but had not led to price reductions at the consumer level.122 
Although the PMAC’s position may come as no surprise given its interest 
in opposing compulsory licenses for patented drugs, it should be  
emphasized that whether compulsory license legislation advances the 
interests of “the pharmaceutical industry” depends on which part of the 
industry one considers—the generics industry or the research-based 
industry. In addition, although the importance of preserving incentives is 
one of the main arguments put forth by the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry, a number of other factors may be far more important in  
promoting innovation. The need to create new products and more efficient 
production methods is important in any industry, and even very old 
industries continue to innovate irrespective of the availability of patent 
protection. With respect to human disease, scientists at government 
institutions and universities will continue to search for effective  
treatments for reasons of tenure, status, benevolence, personal challenge, 
and career advancement. Although universities are unlikely to be able to 
fund the clinical trials necessary to bring drugs to market, governments 
can step in when the need is compelling.  
Tax incentives can also be a tremendous motivation to engage in 
R&D. According to Paul K. Gorecki and Ida Henderson, the research-
based industry responded positively to tax incentive schemes of the 
 
118. See DONALD M. CAMERON, CAMERON’S PATENT AND TRADE SECRETS LAW 
9-2 (2012), available at http://www.jurisdiction.com/patweb09.pdf (stating 
that the Minister of Consumer and Corporate affairs called for a review of 
the Canadian compulsory licensing regime in 1983); Reality Check: 
Analysis of the CGPA’s Economic Impact Assessment of Proposed 




119. See Gorecki, supra note 116, at 78. 
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history (last visited June 6, 2013). 
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governments of Puerto Rico and Ireland in the 1970s.123 They point out 
that R&D in Canada in 1980 was greater than it was in 1969, a decade 
after the enactment of the compulsory licensing amendments.124 In the 
United States, the tax incentives of the Orphan Drug Act125 have been 
an important spur to innovation in the area of rare diseases.126  
With a view to increasing investment in the pharmaceutical sector, 
bringing the Canadian Patent Act into consonance with international 
practices,127 and preparing Canada for entrance into the Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement of 1987,128 the Act was amended in 1987. The amended 
law included a grandfather provision that left intact those compulsory 
licenses granted prior to June 27, 1986, so long as a Notice of Compliance 
had also been obtained by the licensee prior to this date.129 The Notice of 
Compliance is analogous to FDA approval in that it is an authorization 
of government health authorities that a drug may be sold, in light of 
established efficacy and safety.130 For drugs receiving a Notice of  
Compliance after 1986, patentees were entitled to an exclusivity period 
of at least seven years from the date of notice during which time no 
compulsory license could be asserted.131 Furthermore, companies holding 
patents to any new drug that was invented and developed in Canada 
may apply to the Commissioner of Patents to acquire a special status 
that affords protection to the drug for the term of the patent.132 First,  
123. Id. at 563. 
124. Id. at 564. 
125. 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2012).  
126. See Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G. Guatreaux, All That Is Gold Does 
Not Glitter in Human Clinical Research: A Law-Policy Proposal to 
Brighten the Global “Gold Standard” for Drug Research and Development, 
45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 185, 202 (2012). 
127. Thierry Orlhac, The New Canadian Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing 
Provisions, LEGER ROBIC RICHARD 5 (1990), http://www.robic.ca/ 
admin/pdf/514/167E-TO.pdf; see also Lars Noah, NAFTA’s Impact on the 
Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1293, 1300 n.28 (1997); 
KRISTEN DOUGLAS & CÉLIA JUTRAS, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, PATENT 
PROTECTION FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN CANADA – CHRONOLOGY 
OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 2 (2008), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb9946-e.pdf. 
128. See Christopher Scott Harrison, Comment, Protection of Pharmaceuticals 
as Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 
Versus the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 457, 518 (2001) (“No matter how much the 
Conservatives tried to distance Bill C-22 from the free trade talks, the 
connection between the two was inescapable.”).  
129. Orlhac, supra note 127, at 6.  
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 7; Harrison, supra note 128, at 515. 
132. Orlhac, supra note 127, at 9. 
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for drugs having this status, no compulsory license for the import (as 
distinct from domestic manufacture) can be issued during the entire 
term of the patent.133 Second, licenses for domestic manufacture can be 
granted only after seven years have elapsed from the Notice of Compliance 
and then only if existing sources of supply do not adequately provide for 
the needs of the Canadian market.134  
In 1993, the negotiation of the North American Free Trade  
Agreement presented an opportunity to again adjust Canada’s system of 
compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. In February 1993, the Canadian 
parliament passed Bill C-91, abolishing compulsory licensing for  
pharmaceuticals and simultaneously extending the period of patent 
protection to twenty years.135 This brought Canadian legislation in line 
with the then-forthcoming requirements of TRIPS, which was agreed to 
the following year.  
After twenty years of legislative changes to promote R&D investment, 
there was nevertheless limited growth. In 1987, the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry in Canada committed to investing 10 percent of 
Canadian sales in R&D.136 By 2007, however, the brand-name pharmaceu-
tical industry was investing only 8.3 percent.137 In 2005, Canada had the 
lowest ratio at 8.3 percent after Italy at 6.8 percent.138 These figures were 
much lower than those of the United States139 and certain European 
countries.140 In fact, Apotex, the largest Canadian generic drug company, 
 
133. Id. 
134. Id.  
135. Bohumir Pazderka, Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical R&D Spending 
in Canada, 25 CAN. PUB. POL’Y–ANALYSIS DE POLITIQUES 29, 30 (1999); see 
also Harrison, supra note 128, at 520–21. 
136. THE REAL STORY BEHIND BIG PHARMA’S R&D SPENDING IN CANADA, 




138. Id. at 2. 
139. With regard to the United States, the pharmaceutical research and 
biotechnology enterprises invested a record $65.3 billion dollars in research 
and development in 2009, which was more than a $1.5 billion rise since 
investment in 2008. Between 2001 and 2010, American pharmaceutical 
companies consistently spent approximately 18 percent of domestic sales on 
research and development investments. R&D Investment by U.S. 
Biopharmaceutical Companies Remains Strong Despite Ongoing Economic 
Challenges, PHARMAMANUFACTURING.COM (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.pharmamanufacturing.com/industrynews/2010/057.html. 
140. See The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures: Key Data 2012, EUROPEAN 
FED’N PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS 7, 9, http://www.efpia.eu/sites/ 
www.efpia.eu/files/EFPIA%20Figures%202012%20Final.pdf (last visited 
May 25, 2013). 
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spends 17.6 percent of the company’s sales on R&D and ensures huge 
savings to the Canadian Health system.141 It appears, therefore, that the 
concessions granted to the brand-name companies in Canada by the 
Patent Act of 1987 may not have resulted in the hoped-for increases in 
R&D investment.142  
Proponents of the value of patents in incentivizing R&D investment 
can point to some promising developments since the enactment of India’s 
new patent laws. Prior to 2005, the pharmaceutical industry was 
reluctant to invest in India due to its lax patent rules.143 After 2005, 
multinational firms like Pfizer, Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, and Astra-
Zeneca announced higher investment on drug discovery and clinical 
research in their Indian affiliates.144 For example, in 2006, Lilly entered 
into an agreement with an Indian company, Suven Life Sciences, to 
develop drugs for central nervous system disorders.145 Moreover, Indian 
companies have increased their investment in R&D from 1 percent ten 
years ago to between 6 and 8 percent in 2010.146  
While these statistics might sound encouraging and seem to justify 
the implementation of stricter patent laws, they do not tell an important 
part of the story. Due to a lack of resources, some Indian companies are 
unable to produce new drugs on their own.147 Instead, they must often 
develop new molecules and then license these to multinational companies 
for clinical developments.148 As a result, the Indian companies are 
 
141. The Real Story Behind Big Pharma’s R&D Spending in Canada, CANADIAN 
GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N 5 (2008), http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/ 
en/resources/docs/The%20Real%20Story%20Behind%20Big%20Pharma 
%27s%20RD%20Spending%20in%20Canada2008.pdf. 
142. But see Elizabeth R. Nesbitt, Pharmaceuticals, in POTENTIAL IMPACT ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN 
FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 9-1, 9-2 (1993) (noting that “U.S. and foreign 
investment in the Canadian pharmaceutical industry has increased 
significantly since 1987, when Canada modified the Canadian Patent 
Act.”).  
143. LAURA BLOODGOOD ET AL., COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN INDIA 8-1 (2007), available at http://permanent. 
access.gpo.gov/lps86859/pub3931.pdf. 
144. D. Rahul Das & Nathan A. Evans, India’s New Patent Regime and Its 
Impact on the Global Pharmaceutical Industry, FINNEGAN 5 (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=24 
cedda7-28a3-4ac0-b100-ed9974123e67. 
145. Id. at 4. 
146. Id. at 5. 
147. See SUDIP CHAUDHURI, WORLD HEALTH ORG., R&D FOR DEVELOPMENT OF 
NEW DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES: HOW CAN INDIA CONTRIBUTE 27 
(2005), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/ 
S.%20Chaudhuri.pdf. 
148. Id. 
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targeting drugs that interest large multinational corporations—at the 
expense of the development of treatments for tropical diseases.149  
According to Medicines Sans Frontiers, there has been extremely 
minimal R&D investment in tropical diseases.150 Without research on 
these neglected indications, drugs for conditions such as malaria and 
tuberculosis are unlikely to be developed under the new law, and the 
acute health problems in India will not be addressed. Even if one 
assumes that the multinational corporations in partnership with the 
public sector might decide to develop drugs for tropical diseases, those 
drugs will be subject to patent protection and hence prohibitively 
expensive for most of the population in which they are needed. The use 
of compulsory licensing provisions will therefore be critical for access to 
drugs within India.  
It is apparent that Canada benefitted from a thriving generics  
industry through compulsory licensing. The generous use of compulsory 
licensing provisions in the years following 1969 led to a reduction in drug 
prices.151 In a similar vein, India could strengthen current flexibilities such 
as compulsory licensing to the full extent allowed under TRIPS Articles 30 
and 31,152 and thereby help to ensure the effective use of compulsory 
licensing.  
V. Pharmaceutical Industry Politics 
While the establishment of flexibilities is a necessary condition to 
ensure public health, it is not sufficient standing alone. Political pressure 
by the United States and European nations, including the threat of trade 
sanctions, has resulted in very limited usage of compulsory licensing even 
where national legislation permits it.153 In some cases, “TRIPS-plus” 
 
149. Rama Lakshmi, Foreign Takeovers of Indian Drug Companies Fuel Fear of 
Rising Prices, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/ AR2011031106335.html (quoting a 
government official as stating: “The Indian industry was built to make 
cheap lifesaving medicines available for its poor. But the foreign takeovers 
may shift their focus toward exporting to developed nations.”). 
150. See Jed Odermatt, Investigating New Models of Pharmaceutical Innovation 
to Protect the Human Right to Health, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION 173, 175 (2009).  
151. Allan Z. Litovski, The Law of Unintended Consequences: How Will the 
Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act Affect American 
Health Care?, 13 HEALTH L. 20, 21 (2012). 
152. See Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs 
in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 217, 219 n.34 
(2004) (“Article 30 authorises limited exceptions to patent rights for such 
things as research, prior user rights, and pre-expiration testing.”). 
153. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property 
Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1701 n.22 (2008); Cynthia M. Ho, Patent 
Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under 
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provisions in bilateral treaties have limited the extent to which those 
countries can avail themselves of compulsory licenses or other TRIPS 
flexibilities.154 Lobbyists and corporations that exercise political influence 
further aggravate the situation. 
NGOs and academics interviewed between 2008 and 2010 believed 
that the government of India had not utilized the compulsory license 
provision of the 2005 IPA out of fear of being sanctioned by the United 
States, Europe, or Japan, a feeling exacerbated by the events in  
Thailand in 2007 (discussed below). During the interviews, all stakeholders 
expressed the view that the United States pressures developing countries 
to limit the use of compulsory licensing. Although NGOs and academics 
candidly spoke about their perspectives on this issue, policy makers were 
more restrained in their views regarding the influence of the United 
States. Experts like Professor B.K. Keayla,155 Director of the National 
Commission on Patent Law, and Amit Sengupta,156 Director of Delhi 
Science Forum, noted that the pressure from the United States, Europe, 
and Japan was considerable. Many interviewees cited the 2007 Thai 
experience with compulsory licensing as a prime example of US influence. 
Interviewees opined that the government of India might lack the will to 
grant a compulsory license as a result of potential sanctions.157 To 
understand the adverse impact of bilateral pressures in the post-WTO 
political climate, it is imperative to comprehend the use of the compulsory 
licensing provision by Thailand in 2007 and the impact thereafter.  
The Thai case study points to the role of the pharmaceutical industry 
in suppressing the use of compulsory licenses. In 2001, Thailand launched 
a very successful national drug program that has managed to treat more 
than 82,000 HIV-positive people.158 By 2006, Thailand was home to 
 
TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM REG. 371, 378 (2009) (noting that 
Thailand issued six compulsory licenses despite pressure from the United 
States and European Union).  
154. See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation 
Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: 
Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5 
(2011). 
155. Interview with Professor B.K. Keayla, Dir., Nat’l Comm’n on Patent Law, 
in New Delhi, India (July 2009). 
156. Interview with Amit Sengupta, Dir., Delhi Sci. Forum, in New Delhi, India 
(June 2008). 
157. Id.  
158. Countries Should Find Balance Between Affordable Drugs, Development 
Incentives, WHO Director-General Says in Letter to Thai Health Minister, 




Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013  
An Exploration of Compulsory Licensing 
450 
580,000 people living with HIV/AIDS.159 As newer, better, and more 
expensive treatments became available, however, the government 
program began to experience increasingly high drug costs.160 To make the 
newer drugs available to its citizens at a reasonable cost, the Thai 
Ministry of Health issued compulsory licenses between 2006 and 2007 for 
two HIV drugs, Sustiva (efavirenz) and Kaletra (a combination of 
lopinavir and ritonavir).161 Approximately 20,000 HIV/AIDS patients 
who developed resistance to conventional drugs relied on Kaletra, 
placing a severe financial burden on the public health service.162 
Although Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses was consistent with 
both national law and the TRIPS Agreement, pharmaceutical companies 
and governments of developed countries vehemently criticized the Thai 
government.163 After Thailand issued the Kaletra compulsory license, 
Abbott withdrew all of its products currently undergoing registration in 
Thailand and announced that it would refuse to introduce any new 
products into the Thai market.164 Six drugs are currently not registered 
in Thailand, among them an improved version of Kaletra. The response 
of the US Trade Representative was to place Thailand on its “priority 
watch list,”165 a political sanction that has the effect of embarrassing the 
country against which it is directed.  
 
159. Sunee Sirivichayakul et al., HIV Drug Resistance Transmission Threshold 
Survey in Bangkok, Thailand, 13 ANTIVIRAL THERAPY, Suppl. 2 109, 109 
(2008). 
160. THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH & THE NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY 
OFFICE OF THAILAND, FACTS AND EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES 
RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THREE PATENTED 
ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND 2 (2007), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18718en/s18718en.pdf 
(noting a tenfold increase in public ARV spending between 2001 and 2007). 
161. Id. 
162. Piya Wong, Thailand Backs Off Threat to Break Drug Patents, SCIDEV 
(Feb. 8, 2007), http://www.scidev.net/en/news/thailand-backs-off-threat-
to-break-drug-patents.html. 
163. Id. 
164. See Thomas Fuller, Thailand Takes on Drug Industry, and May Be 
Winning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/04/11/world/asia/11iht-pharma.4.5240049.html; Nicholas Zamiska, 
Abbott Escalates Thai Patent Rift: Firm Pulls Plans to Offer New Drugs in 
Spat with Regime, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/ SB117378109135135324.html.  
165. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 27 
(2007); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012). The report also cited intellectual 
property violations related to optical disc media, book and software piracy, 
cable and signal theft, trademarked apparel and footwear. These issues, 
however, were described as “longstanding concerns,” while the recent 
compulsory licenses were described as reflecting a “weakening of respect for 
patents.” Id.  
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Given the Thai experience, there is uncertainty regarding to what  
extent the compulsory licensing flexibilities permitted by TRIPS can be 
effective in the real world. Provisions like compulsory licensing under-
standably make the pharmaceutical industry nervous. At the same time, it 
is discomfiting that developing countries using these lawful provisions to 
save the lives of their citizens are subjected to political pressure. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations that eventually led to the creation 
of the WTO did not originally include discussions of the TRIPS  
regime.166 The addition of intellectual property rights to the multilateral 
trade negotiations resulted from vigorous lobbying by the pharmaceutical 
industries of the United States, the European Union, and Japan.167 It was 
an attempt by the pharmaceutical industry to stop developing countries’ 
generic industries from growing. Additionally, the pharmaceutical 
industry feared that the manufacturing of cheaper drugs by the generics 
industry discredited their branded versions. Therefore, the developed 
world used the TRIPS regime as a political move to undermine the 
generic industry in the developing nations. More than five years after the 
2001 Doha Declaration called upon WTO members to implement TRIPS 
in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health 
and access to medicine, Thailand acted upon that call. Every country 
that applauded the landmark 2001 Doha Declaration should also show 
respect for actions that expand access to medicines. 
The international community should reevaluate the functioning of the 
compulsory licensing provisions and their implementation in developing 
countries, especially in light of the Thai experience. Each of the policy 
makers interviewed for this Article felt that the Indian government does 
not lack will, and if the necessity arose, that the Indian government 
would use the compulsory licensing provision.168 This belief was partially 
vindicated by the compulsory license granted by India on Nexavar in 
2012. It is pertinent to note, however, that this particular compulsory 
licensing was not a government-use one. The consequences could have 
been different for India if a government-use compulsory licensing was 
issued against a US-based pharmaceutical company as was done in the 
case of Thailand. At the same time, the individuals working at NGOs or 
in academia argued that political and economic pressures would continue 
to stymie the effective use of compulsory licenses in India. In support of 
their view, they could now point to the fact that only a single compulsory 
license has been granted since the 2005 legislation was enacted.  
The initiative of India’s Department of Industrial Policy and  
Promotion (DIPP) to invite comments on the need for a change in 
 
166. Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC 
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 322 (2006). 
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India’s compulsory licensing system169 was a welcome move toward 
making the system more robust. The release of the DIPP Discussion 
Paper on compulsory licensing highlights the government’s intent to 
have a meaningful compulsory licensing scheme that facilitates better 
access to essential drugs both in India and globally. The main objective 
of the Paper was to solicit views from various stakeholders on effective 
use of compulsory licensing and “to develop a predictable environment 
for use of such measures.”170 The DIPP has expressed concern over the 
availability of low-cost drugs during public health emergencies especially 
because many Indian pharmaceutical companies have been taken over by 
foreign companies, and these Indian companies might therefore be 
reluctant to seek a compulsory license.171 The Indian government may 
avail itself of a number of policy tools to combat the crisis, such as more 
effectively using the existing compulsory license provision, increasing the 
robustness of that provision, revising policies regarding foreign ownership 
of Indian pharmaceutical companies, expanding drug price regulation, 
and invoking the Competition Act of 2002 to gauge whether the adverse 
drug pricing is due to anti-competitive behavior.172  
Via the Discussion Paper, the DIPP invited comments from various 
stakeholders to assess various policy choices, such as whether there 
should be guidelines that limit the discretion of the Controller when 
considering a compulsory license173 and whether the Controller should be 
required to examine matters of compulsory licensing within a specific 
time period.174 The DIPP received twenty-seven response papers from 
various stakeholders, including twelve from pharmaceutical companies or 
law firms representing the industry.175 The US-India Business Council, 
the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers in India, and the Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association expressed concerns over 
legislative reforms on compulsory licensing.176 They argued that such 
reforms will inhibit and discourage innovation and will not attract 
foreign direct investment.177 It is evident from these responses that the 
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176. Id.  
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pharmaceutical industry has considerable concerns regarding legislative 
reforms related to compulsory licensing. The Thai case and these 
responses reflect the strong opposition that exists to implementing 
compulsory licensing reform.  
Even though India has not resorted to using compulsory licensing in 
the context of ARV drugs, there soon may be a time when it becomes 
necessary. The above legal and political analyses provide evidence that 
the implementation of compulsory licensing in its current form may be 
difficult. The effective use of India’s compulsory licensing system can be 
achieved only after legal ambiguities and cumbersome administrative 
procedures are clarified and revised. A proactive initiative by policy 
makers to reform the compulsory licensing scheme is imperative.  
The interviews with stakeholders in this Article demonstrate that 
while the policy makers and government officials are optimistic about 
the compulsory licensing provision, some of the academics, and especially 
the NGOs, remain skeptical. The differences in perspective could result 
from policymakers who view the WTO as a whole and focus on the 
generous benefits accorded to India in the context of other WTO 
agreements. However, recent moves by the Indian government are 
encouraging and may pave the way for broader use of the compulsory 
licensing provision,178 notably for ARV drugs. 
Civil society and others are particularly skeptical due to the lack of 
robust legal provisions and the lingering memories from the 2007 events 
in Thailand. There is growing concern among these groups that the 
government may not utilize the TRIPS flexibilities when needed because 
of the fear of trade sanctions from countries like the United States.179 
The compulsory license on Nexavar that was recently issued in India 
affected a patent held by German drug giant Bayer—not a US pharma-
ceutical company—and it is important to consider whether the outcome 
might have been different if the pharmaceutical company had been based 
in the United States. At the same time, Indian policy makers insist that 
they would not hesitate to use the compulsory licensing provision if the 
need arose.180 This is reassuring in light of the fact that it is this group 
that will eventually be a part of the body that makes decisions on the 
use of compulsory licensing in India.  
25, 2010), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2010/08/dipp-discussion-paper-
on-compulsory.html. 
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There are some experts like Tahir Amin, co-founder of a nonprofit 
initiative that seeks to increase access to medicines, who think that 
compulsory licensing is not a workable provision and that the pre- and 
post-grant oppositions are a much better remedy.181 The pre-grant and 
post-grant opposition provisions, primarily employed to filter out 
frivolous patents, seem to be very effective and have been recently 
utilized in numerous cases by civil society members. The Indian Patent 
Act of 2005 provides for both pre- and post-grant oppositions. A patent 
can be opposed on a number of grounds both pre- and post-grant, 
including lack of inventorship, anticipation (including anticipation by 
indigenous knowledge that is transmitted orally), obviousness, inappro-
priate subject matter, lack of adequate written description, failure to 
disclose material information to the patent office, and failure to describe 
the geographic source of biological material (a requirement designed to 
combat biopiracy).182 Post-grant oppositions must be made no later than 
one year after the patent has been granted.183  
The availability of opposition proceedings has resulted in a number 
of pivotal efforts that have successfully enhanced access to treatment in 
India. The Viramune (nevirapine) syrup opposition case set an  
important precedent for all future ARV patent oppositions in India. In 
that case, a pre-grant opposition was filed by HIV/AIDS groups in India 
challenging the patent application for nevirapine syrup, a pediatric drug 
used in the treatment of HIV-positive children who are unable to 
swallow conventional ARV drugs. In June 2008, the Indian Patent Office 
rejected the patent application of a German pharmaceutical company on 
both technical and public health grounds, finding that the syrup was 
merely a new form of a drug invented before 1995 and therefore ineligible 
for protection.184 This landmark ruling renewed hope for the ongoing 
patent oppositions regarding other ARV drugs in India such as Reyataz 
(atazanavir), Sustiva (efavirenz), Valcyte (valganciclovir), and Viread 
(tenofovir).185  
 
181. See Corinna Wu, India Overrides Patent on Cancer Drug, CANCER TODAY 
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Despite significant promise, the pre- and post-grant opposition  
provisions can be used only to prevent (or rescind) patent grants on new 
drugs. Access to earlier-patented drugs therefore remains an issue. It is 
also important to note that patent oppositions may not always be 
successful. Among the recent pre-grant opposition applications filed by 
the Lawyers Collective in India, at least one has been unsuccessful: a 
post-grant application filed by Sankalp Trust Roche for Pegasys was 
rejected by the Indian patent office in 2009.186 Where oppositions fail, 
compulsory licenses remain an option. For at least two reasons,  
compulsory licensing may in any event be preferable. First, because 
transportation costs raise total costs if drugs must be imported. Drugs 
manufactured domestically under a compulsory license can substantially 
reduce costs. Second, compulsory licensing has been used by many 
countries in the past and is therefore a more familiar process. The 
United States and Canada have issued the largest number of compulsory 
licenses in the past,187 with Canada generously using its compulsory 
licensing provision prior to the amendments discussed earlier.188  
Therefore, compulsory licensing may be a more promising means of 
facilitating access to drugs.189 
There is an urgent need to amend the Indian Patent Act to simplify 
the administrative procedures and facilitate the issuance of compulsory 
licenses, including the fixing of a predictable and reasonable royalty. The 
compulsory licensing provision, if suitably amended, could be a robust 
provision that ensures access to essential drugs not only within India but 
also globally. Most of the access-to-treatment regimes of sub-Saharan 
African countries are heavily dependent on the Indian generics industry. 
The most elaborate programs to combat HIV/AIDS, such as the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,190 the Clinton Health 
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Access Initiative,191 and Medicine Sans Frontiers,192 are all primarily 
dependent on Indian generics companies for affordable ARV drugs. 
Policy in India therefore impacts not only Indian citizens but also those 
living in other developing countries. In such a delicate situation, there is 
reason to be optimistic that the Indian government’s decision to issue 
compulsory licenses to facilitate access to drugs globally may not be too 
strongly opposed by other nations such as the United States, which 
sponsors the largest AIDS relief program in the world and coordinates 
the importation of 98 percent of the drugs originating in India and 
destined for twenty-one sub-Saharan African countries.193 Furthermore, 
recent changes in the balance of power due to the economic crisis in the 
West may significantly change the attitudes of developed countries 
toward growing economic powers such as India and China. 
Conclusion 
The recent compulsory license granted in India coupled with the  
experiences of Thailand and Canada demonstrate that compulsory 
licensing, if used, can be an effective tool to provide access to essential 
medicines. However, numerous factors, including government will and 
external pressures, significantly affect the implementation of compulsory 
licensing regimes. Given existing international and bilateral pressures, 
compulsory licensing in India can be legally, administratively, and 
politically challenging. 
Although Indian law provides for the issuance of compulsory licenses, 
the current provisions may be too cumbersome and time consuming for 
compulsory licensing on recently patented drugs such as second- or 
third-generation ARV drugs. The experts interviewed in this Article 
provided mixed views on the sufficiency of compulsory licensing in India. 
While some experts felt that compulsory licensing could be an effective 
tool, others were more skeptical.  
The Canadian Patent Act provides a model for the use of compulsory 
licensing in moderating drugs prices and suggests the feasibility of similar 
changes in India. India must take full advantage of the flexibilities 
permitted under the TRIPS Agreement in order to realize the goal of 
providing life-saving health care to its population. To do so, the govern-
ment must amend the Indian Patent Act so as to create a rapid and 
efficient process for granting compulsory licenses when necessary. These 
 
191. See generally Clinton Health Access Initiative, CLINTON FOUND., 
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/main/our-work/by-initiative/clinton-
health-access-initiative/about.html (last visited May 25, 2013). 
192. About MSF, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.msf.org/3/ 
www.msf.org/msf/about-msf/about-msf_home.cfm.htm. 
193. About PEPFAR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.pepfar.gov/about/ 
index.htm (last visited May 25, 2013). 
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licenses should be granted at standard and transparent royalty rates set 
by the Commissioner of Patents. The law should also be amended to 
provide the Commissioner with sensible guidelines to limit the Commis-
sioner’s discretion, provide a measure of predictability, and ensure a 
royalty rate that is both fair to the patent holder and within the financial 
reach of the licensee. Additional statutory limits are needed to prevent 
companies from deliberately obstructing the compulsory license process 
through litigation and delay. Finally, the government should consider 
issuing compulsory licenses on ARV drugs and other essential medicines 
with greater frequency to help ensure that these life-saving drugs continue 
to be priced competitively both in India and throughout the world.  
